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THE
VISIBLE PURSUIT
OF A
FOREIGN INTEREST,
In Opposition to the INTERESTS of
ENGLAND,

Proved from FACTS stated in a *Circular Rescript* lately publish'd by the young Elector of *Bavaria*, setting forth the Negotiations of Peace at *Hanau* in 1743, managed by the Prince of *Hesse* and an *English* MINISTER.

To which is annex'd
The afore said *Circular Rescript* done into *English*.
In a LETTER to my Lord B——e,



L O N D O N:
Printed for M. COOPER, at the Globe in
Pater-noster-Row. 1745.

[Price One Shilling.]

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TO



1811



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VISIBLE PURSUIT
OF A
FOREIGN INTEREST,
In Opposition to the
INTERESTS of *England, &c.*

In a LETTER to my Lord B—e.

My LORD,

DID not a Patriot-concern for your Country divert you from giving way to an envious Joy, so natural to Man, on seeing the Errors of modern Statesmen, how might your Lordship indulge your self with the gross Misconduct of the Directors of our Cabinet? While you had any Share in the Direction of our Affairs, your Thoughts were

A 2 employ'd

employ'd in procuring Ease and all the other Blessings of Peace to your Country: Nor were you charged, that I can remember, but with putting an End to the War, or, to put the Matter in the strongest Light against you, according to your Enemies themselves, *with putting an inglorious End to a successful War.*

This was but the Language of Envy and Rage, Disappointment and Party. It was not that of the Nation; for they exulted in the Peace, and bless'd the Hand that procured it for them. Even then, when Party-Strife ran higher than ever was known, your Wisdom was generally applauded; and why, but because the whole People felt the good Effects of it in the Security of their Freedom, the Decrease of their Burden, and Extension of their Trade.

But *Time*, my Lord, that unfolds all Mysteries, and mellows all rancorous Prejudices; *Time*, which calls forth true Merit and produces it in its genuine Light; *Time*, which is ever accompanied by *Experience*, the most unerring human Guide, has taught the present Age, by comparing yours and your Successor's System of Politics, to applaud the one and condemn the other. And it is your Lordship's peculiar Happiness to live to see, not only this, but all the other Nations of *Europe*, join in Commendations of the Rectitude of your Measures.

You

You procured us a *Peace*, which, had the Views and Intentions of it been pursued, would have secured for ever the *European Balance of Power*, and by Consequence, the House of *Austria*, which has of late cost us so many useless Millions to support, against any Attempts of that of *Bourbon*. You procured us a *Treaty of Commerce*, which, had it been pursued, would have ruin'd for ever the *Woollen Manufactories* of our Rival, *France*, and by Consequence, would have raised our own beyond what they ever were or can be.

(a) This has been confess'd in the clearest and most explicit Manner, and to the eternal Honour of your Lordship's Administration, by even those who had the chiefest Hand in obstructing the Operations of that valuable *Treaty of Commerce*. And the Conduct of all your Successors, since your Time, does cast such a Lustre on your Ministry, in Regard to our foreign Affairs, that the World no longer hesitates to pronounce in favour of the Peace of *Utrecht*.

But,

(a) So strong a Party-spirit was raised against the *Treaty of Commerce* obtain'd for us from France at *Utrecht*, that a Negative was put upon it in Parliament in 1713; on which Occasion there were Bonfires all over France. But in 1716 Mr. Daniel Pultney was dispatch'd to Paris to endeavour to persuade the Court of France to let us have the Benefit of that Treaty, which was flatly refus'd.

But, my Lord, you had no *Interest* separate from that of your Country to pursue; you had none in your Way to obstruct your putting an End to a War, which however successful, we were unable to support from the Inequality of the Burden our Allies had all along thrown upon us. We had then no *foreign Concerns* to bias our Councils or influence our Ministers. It was not necessary to pay Court *Any where*, at the Expence of *England*, which wanted no Aggrandizement or *Acquisition* of Territory on the Continent. You had no Opposition in the Cabinet; none from the T—e: All that you had to struggle with was a Party in Parliament, in Spight of which you procured us a Peace, which *Time* has approved and ratified, when we were ready to sink under the unequal Weight of a glorious War.

How happy had it been for this Nation if the same *peaceful Spirit* had been predominant in our Councils a few Years before, when the *blank Sheet* was put into our Hands by *France* at *Gertruydenberg* in 1709. How happy would it be for this poor, bleeding Country, if a late *Successor* of your Lordship's had been influenc'd by the same benign *Spirit of Peace* while he was at *Hanau* and *Aschaffenburg* in 1743! How many Lives might have been preserved; how many Millions might have been saved since the memorable Campaign of *Dettingen*!

Though

Though some Ministers have a Knack of diverting the Attention of the *Public* from the Measures of the Cabinet, the Conduct of our late Minister, while he was last abroad with his M—r, was pretty well known and understood. It was known that Offers of Peace were made and *rejected*; and it was understood in the Main, that such Offers were made as might be accepted with Safety and Honour. But till his Electoral Highness of *Bavaria* has thought proper to publish the whole Transaction, for the Justification of his Father, the late Emperor, it could not be said that the Public had those Lights and Informations, which are necessary for judging with Equity and Propriety of the Wisdom and Probity of Statesmen.

But, my Lord, these Lights are now held out to us, these Informations are at last come to us from a Prince, as yet untinged with the Quibbles and Evasions of the Cabinet; who, if inclined to gloss his own Cause, would not venture promulging, what might be contradicted by a Crowd of Witnesses. The *Rescript* that has brought this Trouble on your Lordship, and which shall be now examin'd, has been publish'd some Weeks; and if it had contain'd any Untruths, there is scarce a Doubt that we should have heard of so gross an Imposition on the Public, from a *Person* the most concern'd, or from some Scribe employ'd by him. But as no such Confutation has

has appear'd, it must be taken for granted that the *Bavarian* Rescript contains no Falshoods. And on this Supposition, what Title have our Ministers to the good Opinion of their fellow Subjects? What Opinion can we have of their Wisdom and Integrity? What *English* Breast does not glow with Indignation to see his Country plunged into a ruinous, and expensive *Land-War*, when it might be avoided with Safety and Honour? What *Englishman* would refuse his Assent to punishing with the utmost Rigour, the *Man* that should obstruct the Blessings of a general Peace, when offer'd on such Terms as the most successful War might claim?

What more could the Queen of *Hungary* expect from the late Emperor than he offer'd our Prince at *Hanau*? or was she untractable and unreasonable, what more could, or ought an *English* Minister insist upon in order to colour the Continuance of the Expence of his bleeding Country? 'Tis admitted that the Emperor's Affairs were reduced to a low Ebb about the Time of the Negotiations at *Hanau*, and that the Queen took a favourable Turn. But was not that a favourable Conjunction for an *English* Minister to lay Hold of in order to ease his Country and give Peace to *Europe*?

Your Lordship will observe, no Doubt; that I seem inclined to lean more upon One than on many *English* Ministers in the Obstruction

struction given to the proffer'd Peace at *Hanau*. I own I do, and for many Reasons; though we find it insinuated to the Prince of *Hesse*, at *Hanau*, that the Obstruction travell'd from this Side of the Water in Company with the Courier dispatch'd by Lord C——t, for the Approbation of the then Regency.

We don't deny that a Courier was dispatch'd by that Nobleman from *Hanau* for the Opinion of the *Regency* on that important Occasion; and perhaps the doing so was the most artful Step of his Administration. But the World is now too well acquainted with the Secrets of the whole Transaction, not to know that such an Answer was to be eccho'd back to *Hanau* as came recommended from thence; not unlike Addresses of P——t, which eccho back the Substance of a Speech from the Throne.

By imputing the Obstruction to a Peace at *Hanau*, to one of our Ministers, I am far from thinking the rest of them blameless, any more than I should the Houses of P——t for submitting their Reason to Influence, Complaisance or Custom. But, my Lord, we live in an Age when the Will of a Minister, supposed to speak the Will of his M---r, is a Law in most *Assemblies*. We have seen it for twenty Years together universally obey'd with the utmost Implicitness; and it is doubted no less that the Spirit of the *Negotiator*

ciator at *Hanau* presided at our Council-Table here at Home. Ignominious Subserviency!

But, my Lord, let who will bear the Blame, sure I am that Blame is most meritoriously due to some Body for having obstructed such a Peace, as I fear will never be offer'd us again. Such was our Misfortune at *Gertruydenberg*, where *France* offer'd what the most sanguine Hopes could suggest; yet so fond were our Ministers of War, or some of them of sharing in the Expence which it created, that we were glad a few Years after to accept of more moderate Terms. And if the Peace of *Utrecht* was no better, they alone were answerable who refus'd a glorious one at *Gertruydenberg*, and not they who afterwards saw an absolute Necessity for easing their Country of the sinking, unequal Burden flung upon her, by Allies, who were to reap all the Benefit.

No less safe and glorious was the Peace offer'd at *Hanau*. It was safe, because the House of *Austria*, in favour of which we were supposed to have taken up Arms, and the Tranquillity of the Empire, were effectually secured by the Terms offer'd by the Emperor; and it was glorious for *England*, because these Terms were procured by Means of her Influence and Power. But can we flatter ourselves that such Terms will ever again be offer'd? Is there a Prospect that we shall be in a Condition to force the Enemy
to

Enemy to grant better or even so good Terms of Peace? And if we are oblig'd to take up with infinitely worse Terms after we shall have expended many more Millions, who are we to blame but the *Man* who obstructed the safe and glorious Peace offer'd at *Hanau*?

But this *Man*, this self-sufficient, daring *Man* would insinuate, that the Obstruction, was given by the then *Regency*, who were willing *that France should be longer burden'd with the Support of the Emperor*. The *Minister* might hope to pass this frothy Reason on the Prince of *Hesse*, on a Supposition that he was unacquainted with the Influence of the *Crown* on this Side the Water; but, my Lord, it would be an Aggravation of Guilt, and the highest Insult for an *Englishman* to attempt imposing any Excuse so gross and vague on the *English Nation*, who were sensible of the Influence and Power of the *Crown* and *Minister*. Can we forget by whose Influence 16,000 useless *Hanoverians* were saddled upon *England*? What *English Memory* so short as not to remember that the memorable Treaty of *Hanover* in 1725, that of *Seville* in 1729, and the famous *Convention*, later than either, were the blessed Fruits of ministerial Power and the Influence of the *Crown*? Can we, I say, remember these and a thousand other Transactions in the late and immediately-preceding Administra-

tions, and not conclude that the *Regency* did only eccho back the *Obstructions* dictated to them from *Hanau*?

The *Regency*, left to themselves, could not possibly object to the Terms offer'd by the Emperor. No *Englishman* that was free and *ungermaniz'd*, could be against a Peace that eased his sinking Country, at the same Time that it secured the House of *Austria* and restored Tranquillity to the Empire. What could a *Regency*, if compos'd of true-hearted *Englishmen*, desire or wish for, but such a Peace? Did our Guaranty of the *Pragmatic Sanction* imply any Thing more? Did our vast Expence and arming in Support of that *Sanction*, mean any Thing else?

The Design of the *Pragmatic Sanction* was to maintain the *Indivisibilty* of the Succession of the House of *Austria*. The Design of our *Guaranty* was the same, on a Supposition, no Doubt, that the Power and Grandeur of that hereditary Enemy to the House of *Bourbon*, would be a Curb to the Ambition of *France*. We arm'd in Consequence of our *Guaranty*; we expended our Millions in Support of it from the Death of the Emperor *Charles VI.* to the Treaty at *Hanau*; we hazarded alone to bear up against the Power of *France* in order to answer the End of our *Guaranty*, which was the maintaining the Heirefs of *Austria*, in
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the entire Possession of her Father's Dominions.

These Views and Designs were salutary and glorious, because they tended to the securing universal Freedom, and the Balance of Power. But, my Lord, might not these great and glorious Ends be fully answer'd by a Treaty founded on the Terms offer'd by the late Emperor at *Hanau*? There is no denying they might: They were such as speak their own Efficacy and Importance. 'Tis impossible the *Regency* should mistake the significant Purport of the Terms offer'd by the late Emperor. 'Tis impossible they should not see, that a Peace founded on the preliminary Articles settled at *Hanau*, would answer every Purpose of our Arming, every End of our Guaranty, and every View we could have of embarking in the Broils of the Continent.

Therefore, if it be true that the *Negative* went from *Whitehall* to *Hanau*; if it be true that the *Regents* had actually obstructed the Treaty of *Hanau*, for the Reasons assign'd in the *Rescript*, we may venture reckoning the Dissolution of our ancient and glorious Constitution to be at hand. It may weather the ministerial Storm; the Wounds given by a single Arm may be heal'd: But when Numbers join to stab it, the Odds are great that the Vitals, the noble Parts are touch'd. Adieu to *Freedom*, whenever *Corruption* taints the

the Virtue, and blinds the good Sense of *all* the high-born Counsellors and great Officers of the Crown.

But, my Lord, the Obstruction to the Treaty of *Hanau*, could not come from Numbers. 'Twas impossible that all the Members of the *Regency* should so far forget they were *Englishmen*, as to obstruct a Treaty that would prevent a *Land-War*, the biggest Curse that could light on their Country. And I should think it improbable that any Man who did not obstruct so salutary a Treaty, would lie under the Imputation of being accessory to an Act which every *Englishman* should blush to commit. But we have heard of no Member of that *Regency* that resign'd, or so much as enter'd a *Protest* in the Journal of that Board on Occasion of the Treaty of *Hanau*.

If then the Obstruction did not come from the *Regency*, it must come from the *single Minister* who negociated the Treaty. *Respect and Decency won't permit us to go higher.* And as for the Court of *Vienna*, could it be suppos'd the Queen of *Hungary* would not willingly agree to a Peace that took away all Claims from her Enemy and secured her Possessions, we had it in our Power to oblige her to come to Measures that secured the Liberty and Peace of the Empire, Measures that could not fail of procuring the Blessing of Peace to all the States of *Europe*.

No,

No, my Lord, *Peace* was no Object in the View of the *Negotiator*. *Peace* would not contribute to the *Arrondissement* of the E——e; and probably, the Minister held his Post by no other Tenure. But with your Lordship's Leave, we will cast a cursory Eye on the Terms of *Peace* refus'd at *Hanau*, before we enter into a Discussion of the Motives that might have induced the *Minister* to break off the *Negotiation* with the late Emperor. 'Tis true, they are to be found at large in the *Rescript*; but I shall collect, and bring them into as narrow a Compass as possible, that they may be taken in one View. Thus shall it be seen at once, whether the Minister consulted a Native or *foreign Interest*; and whether he steer'd by an *English* or *Hanoverian* Compass.

A Summary of the preliminary Articles agreed to by the Emperor at Hanau.

The Emperor oblig'd himself to dismiss the Troops *France* had lent him, and send them out of the Empire.

He offer'd to concur with the *Maritime* and other Powers, in obliging *France* to consent to a firm and general *Peace* in the Empire.

He agreed to renounce in the amplest Manner for himself and his Descendants to the Succession of the House of *Austria*.

He

He offer'd to recognize the Queen of *Hungary* and agree to the Activity of the Vote of *Bohemia*.

He consented that a neutral Army of the Empire should be assembled, to which he would join 15,000 of his own Men, which we suppose were all his Forces, which Army should garrison not only all the strong Fortresses of his hereditary Dominions, but even those belonging to the Empire, as *Philipsbourg* and Fort *Kiel*.

And he offer'd likewise to give the *Maritime Powers* particularly, whatever other Assurances they could expect of his Integrity and good Intentions.

Pray, my noble Lord, what more could be expected from the Emperor? What more could he have offer'd; or if he had made greater Offers, what more could he perform? The House of *Austria* was secured forever by the Offers he made, which was all the Concern *England* had in the Quarrel: And the *Peace* and *Liberty* of the Empire were secured, which ought to be the only Concern of *Hanover*. But, my Lord, are we not warranted from the Obstructions to the Peace of *Hanau*, to suspect at least, that *Hanover* had some nearer Concerns in View than the general Tranquillity and Freedom of the Empire? And is there not room for suspecting that *England* was made to continue the War in order to promote some particular Views relative

relative to *Hanover* only? The Queen of *Hungary* could have no Interest in prolonging the War, unless we can suppose she had a View to the Recovery of *Silesia* back from *Prussia*, which would be an Injustice to her Faith and Honour, because at that Time the King of *Prussia* had not, nor was likely to give her any Umbrage or Jealousy.

The Court of *Vienna* could not possibly hope to gain more by the Continuance of the War, than was offer'd at *Hanau*; and the Queen of *Hungary* might reasonably suppose that her refusing a safe and honourable Peace would raise her fresh Enemies in the Empire, where her House had been view'd for a long Time with jealous Eyes. She might see that the Honour of the *Germanic* Body was touch'd in any Severity and Indignity she might offer to the Head of the Empire; and that Princes, already jealous of the Power of her House, would make her severe Usage to the Emperor a Pretext for leaguings against her. She might know that the King of *Prussia*, particularly since he had forced the Cession of best Part of one of her richest Provinces from her, would not wish her to be in a Condition to wrest it from him again: And she must forget the Address and insinuating Arts of *France*, if she did not suppose that that hereditary Enemy of her Family would lay Hold of so favourable an Opportunity, as her Refusal of so glorious a

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Peace,

Peace, for stirring up the Princes of the Empire against her.

It would be wronging the Judgment of the Queen of *Hungary* to say she did not foresee the bad Consequences of her Refusal of the Peace offer'd her at *Hanau*. She might be willing to be reimburs'd the Charge of a War unjustly forced upon her, and to be indemnify'd for her Cession of *Silesia*. But she knew that neither was in the Emperor's Power, and that without the hearty Concurrence of the Empire and the *Dutch* there was no Probability that she could make herself whole at the Expence of *France*: She plainly saw the *Dutch* were not inclin'd to embark in a War, and she could never hope that the great Powers of the Empire would contribute to her Aggrandizement.

Therefore, my Lord, the Obstruction to the Peace did not come from *Vienna*; it could not come originally from thence, because the Queen of *Hungary*, as has been said, had much to fear and little to hope by the Continuance of the War. The League of *Frankfort*, which was the Fruit of the Obstruction to the Peace at *Hanau*, was no more than might and actually was expected by the most discerning of that Princess's Counsellors. And had not the ill Conduct of the *French* Generals, or the sudden Illness of their King, favour'd the Queen of *Hungary*, she must have been reduced to the Necessity of begging any
Peace

Peace of that Prince whose Offers had been contemptuously rejected at *Hanau*.

But the Rejection came not from that wise Princess primarily, any more than the March of her Army for the Conquest of *Alsace*, at a Time that she knew of the League of *Francfort*, and that she must see that the King of *Prussia* only waited for the Absence of her Troops to invade *Bohemia*. But she must submit to the *Desires* of a powerful *Ally* to whom she had been obliged, though she might have perceiv'd Danger in the Submission: She knew of the jealous Enmity of most of the Princes of the Empire to her House, and she might be willing to secure at all Hazards the Friendship of *Hanover*, become powerful by its Connexion with *England*, as a Counter-ballance to such *German* Powers as she knew to be jealous of her Family.

But need we apologize for a Princess whom the very *Rescript* of her Enemy acquits of obstructing the Peace? The *English* Minister who negociated at *Hanau*, says not that the Queen of *Hungary* rejected the Peace. He said indeed, *That the Regency of England did not think it as yet Time to ease France of the Burden of the Emperor*, but does not so much as insinuate, that the Queen was for continuing her own Burden, in order to oblige *France* to continue her's. The Honour of

such new-fangled Policy was reserved for our *English Machiavels*.

I would defy the old (a) *Florentine* himself, or his crafty Successors, *Richlieu* and *Maxarine*, to have struck out a more refin'd Maxim of Policy than that imputed by the *English* Minister, at *Hanau*, to the Regency. 'Tis so singularly curious and fine spun, that it would be Pity not to give it your Lordship in its native Dress. I have done the *Negotiator's* Expressions all the Justice I could in my Translation. But as no Translation can be so energetic and beautiful as the Original, 'tis but reasonable that the Curious have Satisfaction.

Le Lord Carteret dit que le Ministere Anglois ne jugeoit pas que le tems fut venu de tirer l'Empereur d'embarras, & qu'il étoit plus convenable de le laisser encore à la charge de la France, qui se trouveroit à la fin hors d'état de fournir à ces dispenses; &c.

Your Lordship sees here evidently, that it was not the Queen, but the *English Ministry* who obstructed the Peace, and were fond of continuing the vast Expence of their Country, that *France* might be obliged to a larger. There is not a Word throughout the *Rescript* insinuating that the Obstruction came from the Court of *Vienna*: And one would think that it might come more decently from

(a) *Machiavel* was a Native of *Florence*.

thence,

thence, than from a Prince to whom the Emperor apply'd as a *Mediator*. Methinks it would have been less unbecoming for the Court of *Vienna*, at open War with the Emperor, to put a Slight upon that Prince's Offers of Peace, than for that of *London* to do it, that was actually a neutral Court. But why must the Blame be thrown on the Regency of *England*? Was not the Ministry of *Vienna* more nearly interested in the Peace, than the Regency; and why should these alone be made answerable for the Consequences and bear the Odium of obstructing a Peace that would give Repose to *Europe*? The Answer is obvious and natural.

Had it been told the Prince of *Hesse*, the Emperor's Plenipotentiary at *Hanau*, that the Obstruction came from *Vienna*, when it actually did not, the Truth would have been soon and easily known and proclaim'd to all *Europe*. A Man, however slippery and adventurous, does not care to be cover'd all over with Infamy; and, however daring and bold, does not care venturing to take upon him alone the nominal Blame of opposing a salutary Peace for the Sake of continuing the War in order to promote an Interest *foreign* to that of his Country.

Therefore the *Regency* must be made accountable for the Obstruction rather than the M—r who may have directed to that *Board* what Answer he would have return'd. There are
various

various Ways, whereby a M——r in the Confidence of his Royal Master, may be said to dictate, on the like Occasion, without doing it magisterially. 'Tis enough for such a one to insinuate slyly what would please or correspond with the *Resolution* taken abroad. There is nothing easier, in so corrupt an Age and Nation as ours, than for a Favourite Minister, by suggesting the Will and Pleasure of the P——e, to obtain all he wants. Did not the late Earl of *Orford*, for twenty Years together, obtain the Consent, even of P——t, to all he desired, by suggesting that his *Desires* were echoed to him from the T——e? Need I expatiate on a Subject so well known? Ought I not rather to drop a Subject too delicate to be sifted to the Bottom? The modern *Passiveness* of Senates and Councils is a Topic that won't bear much handling at present. We will therefore make a Transition to one more immediately to our Purpose.

Your Lordship must be sensible, that the Terms of Peace offered by the late Emperor at *Hanau*, would answer every Purpose *England* could propose by continuing the War. The Queen of *Hungary* could have no reasonable View but might be answer'd by that Peace; and therefore it was not obstructed by the Court of *Vienna*. I know but *one Prince* in *Europe* who could form any Hopes that a War might turn to his private Advantage.

tage. And I know but of *one Minister* in the World capable of indulging to such partial Hopes.

I was one of those who took Offence at the following Lines in the King of *Prussia's Motives*, imagining them intended as a Reflexion; but the *Bavarian Rescript* clears up the Point, and sets the Matter in a Light I had not consider'd it before.

' These advantageous Terms, though full of Moderation, yet were flatly rejected by the *English Ministry*; which was a sure Sign, that the Intentions of the King of *England* was not to restore the Empire to its Tranquillity, but rather to take Advantage of its Troubles.'— And in another Part of the same *Motives*, his *Prussian Majesty* informs us what those *Expectant Advantages* were, that might have been proposed by not suffering the Empire to be restored to its Tranquillity.

' The Queen of *Hungary*, says the King of *Prussia*, has contracted Alliances, in order to indemnifying certain Powers, and make them Amends for the Extraordinary Helps they have afforded her; which Indemnifyings consisted both in *Fiefs* of the Empire, and in Hopes of secularizing certain commodious Bishopricks.'

These two Facts, though wrote at different Periods of Time, elucidate each other. The *Bavarian Rescript* tells the Offers of
Peace

Peace made by the late Emperor, and the *Prussian Memorial* informs us why they were rejected. But, my Lord, it appears indubitably from both that the Interests of *England* were in no Sense concern'd or consider'd in the Rejection. *England* had nothing to do with *Fiefs* in the Empire, nor with the Secularization of *Bishopricks*. The Business of *England* was to perform her Engagements with the House of *Austria* and restore Peace in the Empire, that the Flames of a general War might not burst from its Broils. The Business of *England* was to promote a Peace that would secure the House of *Austria* in its Rights and Possessions as a Counter-balance to the Ambition of *France*. The Business of *England* was to be at Liberty to prosecute with Vigour the *Spanish*, the only War she had any visible Concern in. In short, the principal Business of *England* was to get out of a consuming ruinous Expence, she had been plung'd into to support Quarrels on the *Continent*, that she may push on her own at Sea and retrieve her Trade.

But, my Lord, would not such a Peace as was rejected at *Hanau* have answer'd all these Views? Would it not answer every View and every Wish that a Patriot-*Englishman* could form, taking in all Considerations and Circumstances? The House of *Austria* would be secure for ever by that Peace, and whole

whole and entire, except Part of the Province of *Silesia*, which we oblig'd the Queen of *Hungary* to part with, with a View to the Safety and Interests of *Hanover*. The Peace would have settled and fix'd the Tranquillity of *Germany*. The Peace would have left us at full Liberty to push on vigorously our *Spanish War*. The Peace would have eased us of the sinking Burden of a *Land-War*, which has at all Times and will for ever be the Ruin of this Nation. And that rejected Peace would have left us nothing to mind but the Improvement of our Trade, the Discharge of our Debts, the lessening our Taxes, and the mending and renewing our Constitution.

There is no denying that such would have been the happy Consequences of a Peace founded on the Terms offered by the late Emperor at *Hanau*. And perhaps the Peace was rejected for fear it should be attended with such Consequences. For, my Lord, the Happiness of *England* may be thought, by *some Men*, to be incompatible with the Interests of *Hanover*. Peace is certainly the Interest of *England*, when it includes general Security: But it may not be thought that Peace would promote the immediate Interest of the E---e. *England* could propose no Gain by a War on the Continent; but *Hanover* may, by new Acquisitions in the Empire. All Acquisitions, however minute, are of

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Importance to a petty State. And Peace could not so soon produce the Alienation of *Imperial Fiefs* and the Secularization of *German Bishopricks*, as War may.

The *Negotiator* at *Hanau* who rejected the Peace, might not expect to be able to add great Provinces to *H——r* by continuing the Broils of *Germany*, but he might have had small *Fiefs* and *Bishopricks* in View: And 'tis better flying at low Game than at none, for a cringing, insinuating Servant. A small *Fief* or *Bishoprick* may be thought as great an Acquisition to a small Dominion, as the *Spanish* Monarchy to *France*.

'Tis with a *German* Prince, who would enlarge his Territories, not very unlike one of our frugal, rich, ingrossing, private Men here in *England*, who has an Estate lying among rich and careful Neighbours. Such a Man has no Chance of enlarging his Estate in such a Neighbourhood, unless he foment Jars, Quarrels and Law-suits among those whose Lands he may have a View to annex to his own. Then indeed, a dextrous Man, that wants not *Money* to purchase, to lend upon Mortgage or otherwise, to support Law-suits, may make his Harvest during the Contests and *Broils* he himself had fomented.

'Tis now almost two Years since the Negotiations at *Hanau*; at least, *England* has been put to two full Years Expence of a Land-

Land-War since the Offers of the late Emperor were rejected by our Court. Let us, with your Lordship's Leave, cast back an Eye on the probable Savings of our Country, had the Peace gone on. I will suppose, if the Peace had proceeded, that *Spain* would have been the single Power in *Europe* that might not disarm immediately, for the Sake of gratifying the Ambition of her Queen, in her Views on Dominions for more of her Sons in *Italy*. But as *Spain* would be no Match for the Queen of *Hungary* in *Italy*, had Peace been made in *Germany*, we need continue no Expence for the Preservation of the *Austrian* Dominions in *Italy*, but what should arise from the keeping a Squadron of Ships in the *Mediterranean* to prevent the Succours of *Spain*. In that Case then the Account may stand thus.

The SAVINGS of England for the Years 1744 and 1745, had not the Offers of the late Emperor been rejected at Hanau in 1743.

As the Negotiations at *Hanau* were begun in the Month of *July*, there is no doubt that the Treaty might have been concluded before the End of *November*, the Time of the Sitting of Parliament; and therefore, for the Year 1744, the following Articles might

have been saved, with all imaginable Safety
to Liberty and the Common Cause.

Pounds Sterl.

The Pay of 16,000 <i>Hano-</i> <i>verians</i> , their Winter-Quar-	
ters, Bread, Waggon, and	
other Douceurs, at a mode-	
rate Computation — —	500,000 0 0
Subsidy to the Queen of <i>Hun-</i>	
<i>gary</i> — —	300,000
Ditto to the King of <i>Sardinia</i>	200,000
The Pay of the Body of <i>Eng-</i> <i>lish</i> Troops in <i>Flanders</i> ,	
and all the other Articles	
consequential of such an	
Army on the Conti-	
nent, which would have	
been useless and unnecessa-	
ry had the Peace been	
made, at least — —	1,000,000
To the Queen of <i>Hungary</i> to	
accelerate Prince <i>Charles's</i>	
Passing the <i>Rhine</i> to <i>Alsace</i>	150,000
To several contingent Articles	
of Expence both at home	
and abroad, the Conse-	
quences of a Land-War,	
computed at about. — —	250,000
To the King of <i>Poland</i> , Elec-	
tor of <i>Saxony</i> , for joining a	
Body of his Troops to the	

Austrians

(29)

Austrians to oppose the K.
of *Prussia* in *Bohemia* ——— 150,000

2,550,000

And to consider the extraordinary Subsidy of 200,000 *l.* to the Queen of *Hungary*, to enable her to pay 8000 *Hanoverians*, and about 50,000 *l.* to defray the Expence of the Corps of *Hanoverians* in our Service last Year, in their Return from *Flanders* home; the Subsidies to the Electors of *Saxony*, *Cologne* and *Mentz*; the Augmentation of *English* Troops in *Flanders*; the extraordinary Pay of the Royal Commander of those Troops; the Augmentation of our Expence this Campaign more than the last, and the Vote of Credit of 500,000 *l.* every Shilling of which, if we may judge by Experience, will be laid out in *Secret Services* or otherwise; if, I say, these and many more minute Articles be taken into the Ac-

count

count of this Year's extraordinary Expence, I think we may compute it, without Exaggeration at — 3,500,000

6,050,000

Your Lordship will easily discern my Intention in giving this incorrect Computation of our extraordinary Expences for this Year and last. 'Tis only to shew at one View, however imperfect, what our *Negotiator* at *Hanau* might have saved his Country, if he had had a certain *Foreign Interest* less, and that of *England* more at Heart. And your Lordship must be sensible, that I might have swell'd the Account from *Six* to *Twelve* Millions *Sterling*, had I taken in the Impediments and Interruptions of our Trade and Industry, and the Captures of our Ships. But was the Loss of Men since the Treaty of *Hanau*, occasioned by the Continuance of the War, brought into the Account, (and the Death of an able working Man may be computed a Loss of 100 *l.* at least, to the Community) this Article alone, of Men lost by Sea and Land, would amount to above 2,000,000 *Sterl.*

It was observed in your Lordship's Administration, that 10,000,000 *l.* at least might have been saved to *England*, had not the Offers of *France* been rejected at *Gertruydenberg* in 1709, besides as much more in Impediments

pediments and Interruptions of Commerce, and the Loss of Subjects. And I am sure it may be said with equal Justice, that it would be a Difference of 20,000,000 *l.* to *England*, if the Offers of the Emperor had not been rejected at *Hanau* in 1743.

We are told, and I will suppose it true, that the young Elector of *Bavaria* has been forced by the late Successes of the Queen of *Hungary's* Arms in his Country, to come to Terms with that Princess. But there is a very wide Difference between the Circumstances and Time of treating with the late and present Electors of *Bavaria*. A Peace between the late Elector and the Queen, as he was Emperor, must have been necessarily follow'd by an entire Tranquillity in the Empire, and very probably all over *Europe*. But the present Peace will not, cannot be attended with the like happy Consequences. The K. of *Prussia* is in Arms, and will find Allies, if the Court of *Vienna* continues to push him. The War in *Italy* will continue, because the Queen of *Hungary* can't supply it as vigorously as she might, if the King of *Prussia* had been unarm'd, as he was at the Time of the Treaty at *Hanau*. *France* has possessed herself of Part of the Barrier in *Flanders*, and may have the Whole this Campaign, a Circumstance that was not when the late Emperor's Offers were rejected by an *English* Ministry at *Hanau*.

There-

Therefore, my Lord, supposing the *Neutrality* of the young Elector of *Bavaria* an uncontroverted Fact, it affords us no such near Prospect of a general Peace as there would be if the Terms offered by the Father had not been rejected. There is no Prospect that we shan't arm and go to the same or a greater Expence the next Year than the last. We have no Reason to think, that they who obstructed a safe and honourable Peace in 1743, will so hastily conclude one in 1745, or that there will be no seeming Necessity or Call for extraordinary *Supplies* in 1746. Whatever Knowledge might be had of *Ministerial Oeconomy* in your Lordship's Administration, the Nation has had no manner of Acquaintance with either that or any other *Publick Virtue* ever since.

What can the Son, the young Elector, give the Queen of *Hungary*, that the Father did not offer and more? The late Emperor offer'd to renounce for himself and Descendants to the Succession of *Austria*; the Son can do no more, and can give no better Security for the Performance of his Word. The Father was to have no Consideration, but to be put in Possession of his own Hereditary Dominions; but the Son is promis'd that the Maritime Powers shall settle the *quantum* of the Compensation the Queen is to give him. In short, the Father offered more than the Son can give, because he had
more

more in his Power; yet the Queen agrees with the Son, and rejected the Offers of the Father.

But, my Lord, this Contrast in the Queen's Behaviour is easily accounted for. She was in *Tutelage* when she rejected the Offers at *Hanau*; she is now at greater Liberty. There is no *English* Minister on the Banks of the *Rhine* to dictate to her; there is *none*, whose Mind is set upon new *German* Acquisitions, none in the Empire to awe her into a Continuance of the War for the Sake of *H—r*. But if the same daring *English* Minister crosses the Sea, and is in the same Degree of *Confidence* he was in at *Hanau*, I won't answer but the Queen of *Hungary* will be buoy'd up with new Hopes, or intimidated to obstruct a Peace this Summer as she was in that of 1743.

In my humble Apprehension, the Queen of *Hungary* won't be permitted to make Peace, that is, discontinue the War, but upon *certain Conditions*, which I think no good *English* Subject would wish she should be able to perform. I know of no *Englishman*, who really loves his Prince, would wish his *foreign Dominions* to be enlarged. Every new Acquisition to the *Electorate* may prove a fresh Incitement for going abroad; and I would never lose Sight of my King if I could help it. Besides, new Acquisitions to *H—r*, must be at the Expence of some

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Neighbour-State or Prince, who, tho' oblig'd to acquiesce for the present, won't fail in-flaming other Powers, and sowing the Seeds of new Broils in *Germany*, in which *England* must certainly be obliged to interfere.

There are, in my Opinion, but two ways for *England* to come at Peace; the first, for *France* to force herself into the Possession of *H---r*. We may remember the *Panic* of some Men, when *Maillebois* was but in the Neighbourhood only. The second way of having Peace is for the Empire to agree that certain contiguous *Fiefs* be added to the *E-----e*, or that certain contiguous *Bishopricks* be secularized and annexed to it in order to an *Arrondissement*. I don't know which of these two Expedients a true *Englishman* would wish to take Place; but am sure he ought to wish for a safe and honourable Peace, let what will come of *H---r*. And I am no less so that we might have had such a Peace at *Hanau* if a foreign Interest had not been visibly pursued in Opposition to the Interests of ENGLAND. I am,

My LORD,

Your Lordship's

Most humble and obedient Servant.



A
TRANSLATION
OF THE
Circular RESCRIPT

Sent by

The Elector of *BAVARIA* to
his Ministers at Foreign Courts,
in *March* 1745.



Aximilian Joseph, Duke of *Ba-*
varia and of the *Upper Pala-*
tinate, Count *Palatine* of the
Rhine, Archduke of *Austria*,
&c.

You will have heard before now, that it
hath pleased the Omnipotent to withdraw
from this frail World, the most serene, most
puissant and invincible Prince, *Charles VII.*
elected Emperor of the *Romans*, &c. our most

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dear

dear Father and Lord ; and that his Imperial Majesty had ended his glorious Life in a manner altogether Christian and exemplary, and with a Greatness of Soul no less heroic and magnanimous.

As his late Imperial Majesty, our dear Father and Lord's Hereditary Dominions, and all their Dependencies, are devolved upon us ; and that we have taken the Reins of Government into our own Hands, under the Divine Protection, in a Conjuncture the most perilous and delicate, the Ties which bind us to *Germany*, our dear Country, the Blood which runs in our Veins, and the Race we are sprung from, our Electoral House, and more especially the respectful Memory of his Imperial Majesty, our honoured Father, exact from us a Publication of some late Transactions, which his Imperial Majesty himself, a little while before his Death, designed to have published as a Testimony of his Inclination to Peace, and to serve as an everlasting Monument of his Disinterestedness and Grandeur of Mind. Herein, on one hand, will appear Facts past all Credibility ; and, on the other, Facts no less extraordinary and unwarrantable.

We shall, at present, take no notice of his Imperial Majesty's unwearied Zeal, as well before as since the Death of the Emperor *Charles VI.* of glorious Memory, to terminate amicably, and without having Recourse to
Arms,

Arms, the Differences arising about the Succession of the House of *Austria*; nor shall we mention how arduously he sought the Prosperity and Tranquillity of the Empire since his Accession to the Imperial Throne: We shall confine ourself simply to the Recital of what passed relating to the Treaty of Friendship and Amity between him and his *Britannic* Majesty, which was agreed to, and on the Point of being signed; and of the Mediation of the Empire, to which their High Mightinesses the States General were invited to join.

We shall set forth the Circumstances of the fruitless Negotiation at *Hanau*, which will not only convince the Public of his Imperial Majesty's Willingness to be reconciled to the Court of *Vienna*, but shew in the clearest Manner, that he attempted by all Means, and neglected no Opportunity of putting an End to the War, and re-establishing the Tranquillity of the Empire, so particularly desirable and necessary: And by this Deduction it will appear, that his Imperial Majesty had consented to relinquish his Rights and sacrifice his own Interests to his Love of Peace, and the public Welfare; an Act of Generosity which will seem incredible to Posterity.

In the Month of *May* 1743, his Imperial Majesty, by the Interposition of Prince *William* Stadt-holder of *Hesse-Cassel*, addressed himself

himself to his *Britannic Majesty*, as a Prince the most proper for mediating a Peace; and to that End he willingly consented to put the whole Negociation into his Majesty's Hands. As he desired nothing so ardently as that *Germany* should enjoy the Benefits of a safe and lasting Peace, he remitted the procuring such a one to his *Britannic Majesty*, with no other Restriction, but that he should be careful of his Glory and Dignity, even at the Expence of the Interests of his Electoral House.

These magnanimous Offers from his Imperial Majesty were reiterated the 2d. and 16th of *June* following, and were continued without Interruption till the Arrival of his *Britannic Majesty* at *Aschaffembourg*. And the first Declaration that was had on the Part of the King, on the Subject of the desired Mediation, was, that his Majesty could not then enter upon any Negociation; but that if his Imperial Majesty would return to *Frankfort*, he would, in such Case, do all that lay in his Power to facilitate a Peace.

So willing was his Imperial Majesty to procure the Tranquillity of his dear Country, that he hesitated not a Moment to correspond with the King's Intentions; and therefore set out immediately from *Munich* his Capital, for *Frankfort*, where he was met by the Landgrave of *Hesse*, who afterwards waited on the King at *Hanau*, where, being duly em-

empowered by his Imperial Majesty, he put the following Propositions into his *Britannic* Majesty's Hands.

‘ That his Imperial Majesty would dismiss such Auxiliary Troops as *France* had sent him to support his Claims to the Succession of the House of *Austria*, and to protect his Hereditary Dominions; but that for so great Condescension, out of his Love to Peace and the Empire, which induced him to agree to the depriving himself of such powerful Succours, he desired

‘ I. That the Troops of the Enemy, (*the Queen of Hungary*) shall evacuate *Bavaria*, the *Upper Palatinate*, and all other Territories belonging to his Electoral House, which shall be restored to him as soon as the Auxiliary Troops of *France* shall have quitted the Empire. That the Armies on the *Main*, as well the *Austrians* as their Auxiliaries, shall likewise quit the Empire, whereby *Germany* may be put on the same Footing, and in the same State as it was immediately after the Decease of the late Emperor *Charles VI.*

‘ II. That the Emperor's Hereditary Dominions being depopulated and ruined by the War, some Expedient be found for supporting his Dignity and his Troops, by a certain monthly Subsidy, till such Time as the mediating Powers, by their good Offices,
‘ shall

‘ shall be able to put Matters on a more regular and permanent Footing.

‘ III. That his Imperial Majesty would submit it to the Empire, and the other mediating Powers to find out Means for obviating all Difficulties concerning the *Austrian* Succession, and the procuring a solid and invariable Peace.

‘ IV. That, in order to establish the most ready and perpetual Friendship and good Understanding between the Parties, he should be glad it would be agreed upon to publish a general Amnesty, to suppress all Sequestrations and Confiscations immediately; and that all Hostages, all Prisoners, and others that had taken Part on either side, should be set at Liberty and forgiven.

‘ V. That the Prisoners of War on both sides be releas’d.

Such were the Points which his Imperial Majesty proposed as Preliminaries of a future Peace; by which it appears evidently, that he preferred Tranquillity, Peace, and the General Interest to his own, tho’ he might reasonably have flatter’d himself, that the Chance of War would be favourable to his Cause.

To these Offers, the following Answer was given the 7th of *July* to the Prince of *Hesse*, by my Lord *Carteret*, his *Britannic Majesty’s* Minister.

‘ That

' That his Majesty was much obliged to
 ' his Serene Highness for what he had come
 ' municated to him on the part of the Em-
 ' peror. That his Majesty desired nothing
 ' so much as the Re-establishment of the
 ' Peace of the Empire and all *Europe*; and
 ' that in order thereto, he was much inclined
 ' to shew his Imperial Majesty all Manner of
 ' Friendship; but that his Majesty could not
 ' act but in Concert with his Ally the Queen
 ' of *Hungary*. That that Princess shew'd
 ' no Repugnance to enter into Measures for
 ' assisting the Emperor, supposing always,
 ' that the Basis of all future Negotiations
 ' would be the Departure of all the *French*
 ' Troops out of the Empire, previous to all
 ' other Steps. That this Obstacle once re-
 ' moved, the King was persuaded the Queen
 ' would shew no Disinclination to a Recon-
 ' ciliation. That however, he, my Lord,
 ' could not take upon him to assure his Se-
 ' rene Highness, for fear of abusing the Con-
 ' fidence he reposed in him, that the Patri-
 ' monial Dominions of *Bavaria* and *Upper*
 ' *Palatinate* would be previously restored.
 ' That all he had Orders to tell his Serene High-
 ' ness was, that the King would do all he could
 ' for his Imperial Majesty, as well in regard
 ' to the Restitution of his Country, as all
 ' other Points, as soon as the Emperor and
 ' Empire would come to a Resolution of
 ' obliging the *French* to evacuate *Germany*.

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Though this Answer of my Lord *Carteret's*, was not such as the Emperor might have expected, yet did it not lessen his pacific Desires, nor slacken his Imperial Majesty's Endeavours to re-establish the Tranquillity of the Empire: Nor did it in the least diminish his Confidence in his *Britannic* Majesty's Mediation, persuading himself *that the King could not have forgot his Imperial Majesty's good Offices and Efforts at the Court of France, in order to divert the Storm which lately threaten'd his Dominions of Brunswick-Lunebourg; it being to him alone that his Britannic Majesty was obliged for the late NEUTRALITY which was granted for that Electorate by his most Christian Majesty.*

The Prince of *Hesse* declared afterwards on the part of the Emperor; ' That his Imperial Majesty had heard with Acknowledgment the friendly Expressions with which the King made known his Intentions; but that his Imperial Majesty could not conceive how his *Britannic* Majesty could insist on the Evacuation by the *French* Auxiliary Troops, before a more definitive and satisfactory Declaration should be obtained in relation to the Preliminary Articles proposed in the Emperor's Name. That his Imperial Majesty having nothing more at Heart than the Re-establishment of the Repose of the Empire, and to that salutary End, the Establishment of a perfect good

Un-

' Understanding between him and the Ad-
 ' verse Party, he was willing to conform
 ' himself to the Views of his *Britannic* Ma-
 ' jesty, by engaging that the Troops of
 ' *France* shall evacuate the Empire, but on
 ' Condition nevertheless that the very Day of
 ' their repassing the *Rhine*, the *Austrian*
 ' Troops should be obliged to evacuate the
 ' Hereditary Dominions of *Bavaria*, which
 ' should then be restored to him; and that
 ' moreover the Execution of other Points
 ' should be considered; and that the combin'd
 ' Army on the *Mayne* should evacuate the
 ' Empire as well as that of *France*.

After many Conferences on the Subject of
 an amicable Accommodation, a preliminary
 Project was settled and agreed to at last, com-
 posed of these subsequent Articles.

I. ' That the Emperor shall dismiss the
 ' *French* Troops, and engage them to quit
 ' the Territories of the Empire.

II. ' That his Imperial Majesty shall im-
 ' mediately co-operate with his *Britannick*
 ' Majesty in forming a Project, in Conjun-
 ' tion with the Empire, the Maritime
 ' Powers and other Potentates, in Mainte-
 ' nance of the *public Good*, and to induce
 ' *France* to consent that a stable and ge-
 ' neral Peace be established in the Empire.

III. ' But as by this Step his Imperial Majesty deprives himself of all Succour on the part of *France*; and considering that his hereditary Dominions are so impoverished by the War, that they are unable to defray his Expence, he shall be paid Monthly a Sum proportion'd to his Expence; the first Payment to begin one Month after perfecting the Agreement, and to be continued till such Time as other Means shall be found in Concert with the Empire, to augment his Revenue in such a Manner, as shall be judged solid and perpetual, and agreeable to his Imperial Dignity and to the Lustre of his Electoral House, in Favour of which the Electorate of *Bavaria* shall be erected into a Kingdom.

IV. ' As it does seem not possible that the Queen of *Hungary* can be persuaded to evacuate *Bavaria* and *Upper-Palatinate* before she be made easy in regard to the Emperor's Pretensions to the Hereditary Dominions of the House of *Austria*, his Imperial Majesty shall renounce all his said Pretensions, as well for his Descendants as for himself.

V. ' As soon as his Imperial Majesty shall have passed the aforesaid Acts of Renunciation, his patrimonial Dominions shall be restored to him, entirely and without any Exception whatever.

VI. ' The

VI. 'The Queen of *Hungary* shall acknowledge his Imperial Majesty as Emperor and Head of the Empire; and his Imperial Majesty shall likewise acknowledge the Queen of *Hungary* and *Bohemia*, and shall co-operate with the Empire as to the Activity of the Vote of *Bohemia* at the *Diet*.

VII. 'The better to establish Confidence and mutual Friendship, a general Amnesty shall be proclaim'd; all Confiscation, Sequestration, and former Inquiry shall cease; all such as have embraced either Party, that have been taken and imprisoned, and particularly all Hostages shall be releas'd and set at full Liberty.

VIII. 'The Prisoners of War on each Side shall be set at Liberty without Ransom, and also all the Cannon, Arms and Utensils of War that had been found in the Arsenals, Fortresses and Castles, belonging as well to his Imperial Majesty, as to particular Persons, comprehending especially what had been taken from the Arsenal of the Citizens of *Munich*, shall be faithfully restor'd.

This Project being settled and drawn up the 15th of *July* at Night, it was absolutely agreed upon and resolved that it should be formally signed the next Day; and in the mean Time the following Project of *Assurance* was agreed to, as a Security to the Emperor, until the above Preliminaries could be

be transmitted to the respective, interested Courts.

‘ As his Imperial Majesty, in agreeing to
 ‘ the aforesaid Preliminaries as the Basis of an
 ‘ Accommodation between himself and the
 ‘ Queen of *Hungary*, hoped that his *Britannic*
 ‘ Majesty would be thoroughly attentive to
 ‘ the faithful Execution of them; his *Bri-*
 ‘ *tannic* Majesty therefore, in regard to the
 ‘ Confidence reposed in him by his Imperial
 ‘ Majesty, and to give him real Proof of his
 ‘ friendly Intentions and good Will, engages
 ‘ to favour his Interest and to employ his
 ‘ good Offices in the most efficacious Manner
 ‘ for procuring him farther and greater Advan-
 ‘ tages, which nevertheless are not to be at the
 ‘ Expence of the Queen of *Hungary*; and as
 ‘ an Earnest of his *Britannic* Majesty’s
 ‘ Friendship and Amity, he will order the
 ‘ Sum of 300,000 Crowns to be paid forth-
 ‘ with to his Imperial Majesty; that is to say,
 ‘ 100,000 on the Perfection of this Act,
 ‘ and the remaining 200,000, moiatively in
 ‘ twenty and forty Days after, in order to
 ‘ defray his Imperial Majesty’s Expences till
 ‘ a more solid Provision be made for him by
 ‘ Treaty: And in the mean while, his *Bri-*
 ‘ *tannic* Majesty will use his best Endeav-
 ‘ ours with the Queen of *Hungary* that she
 ‘ may give Orders to her Officers both Civil
 ‘ and Military, to spare and favour his Imperial
 ‘ Majesty’s hereditary Dominions.

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But the next Day (16th *July*,) instead of signing the Preliminary Articles as was settled the Night before, the subsequent Declaration was put into the Hands of the Prince of *Hesse*.

That though his *Britannic* Majesty had, for himself, approved of the Project of Accommodation, as settled the Night before; and that he would be glad it were finally perfected, so as he might at the same time be able to sign the aforesaid Project of reciprocal Assurance between him and the Emperor; yet he could not determine to enter into any decisive Engagements of that Nature before he had the Sense of his Council in *England* upon it, to see if the Parliament would approve of those Preliminaries as proper to found a Negotiation upon between his Imperial Majesty and the Queen of *Hungary*. That it would not be corresponding with the Confidence reposed in his Majesty by the Emperor, for him to enter into Engagements with his Imperial Majesty, which perhaps he should not be able to execute: That an Answer from *England* could not take up above Fortnight; and that he did not doubt the Preliminaries would be relished there and thought of the last Necessity and utmost Importance in order to a general Tranquillity. That as soon as his Majesty should receive an Answer from *England*, which he did not doubt would

' would be favourable, he would regulate the
 ' Project of Assurance; but that in the mean
 ' while, to convince the Emperor of his
 ' Friendship and good Intentions, he offered
 ' to order for him immediately the Sum of
 ' *One hundred thousand* Crowns, which should
 ' not bind his Imperial Majesty in the least,
 ' any more than the Preliminary Project, un-
 ' less the *English* Council would agree to
 ' promote it at the ensuing Session of Parlia-
 ' ment: But in such Case, the said 100,000
 ' Crowns should be deducted from the
 ' 300,000 payable by the Project of Assur-
 ' ance. That, upon the Whole, the Empe-
 ' ror may be persuaded, that so soon as a fa-
 ' vourable Answer could be had from *Eng-*
 ' *land*, his *Britannic* Majesty would study
 ' the Satisfaction of his Imperial Majesty, and
 ' perhaps exceed his warmest Hopes.'

The Emperor was forced to put up with
 this Answer, and wait the Return of a Cou-
 rier, assured by my Lord *Carteret* to have
 been dispatch'd to *England*. And in the In-
 terim, that Lord insisted on his Imperial
 Majesty's receiving the 100,000 Crowns of-
 fered him by his *Britannic* Majesty; which,
 though it might seem beneath the Dignity of
 his Imperial Majesty, he was however will-
 ing to consent to, that no Suspicion of his
 Sincerity might remain. But declared at the
 same time, that as his Condescension in that
 Instance ought to be look'd upon as a formal
 Obliv-

Obligation and absolute Engagement on his side, he hoped that his *Britannic* Majesty, in whom he put all his Confidence, would at the same Time promise on his Part, to induce the Court of *Vienna* to cease all Hostilities, Sieges, Demolitions of Fortresses, Contributions, Exactions, and other Calamities of War; adding, that as soon as his *Britannic* Majesty should give him such Assurance, he would receive the 100,000 Crowns offered him.

Though it might be reasonably expected that such a Declaration would be relished by his *Britannic* Majesty, yet it happened quite otherwise. And from that Time it was very perceptible, that the King's Council were for withdrawing, by little and little, from their Engagements agreed to and settled by the aforesaid Project of Accommodation. All now was lukewarm and cool on their side; none of that Eagerness for Peace was now seen, which had lately appeared, contenting themselves simply with saying, that they waited for the Return of the Courier sent to *England*.

But my Lord *Carteret* however did not fail to buoy up the Emperor with Hopes; and went so far as to desire it might be told his Imperial Majesty from him, that he hoped he would not take Umbrage at some rude Expressions contained in a late Letter wrote by Count *Kevenbulla* to Count *Seckendorff*,

for fear of 'retarding, by any false Delicacy, the Work of Peace which was in hand, and would, in all Probability, be crown'd with Success.

The Courier was at last returned the 1st of *August* at Night, the very Time Lord *Carteret* had fix'd upon. But from that Moment his Lordship's Language was wholly changed; the Difficulties that obstructed Peace were increas'd, and all Hopes of arriving at so great a Blessing were suddenly vanished. My Lord *Carteret* said, 'the *English* Ministry were of Opinion, that the Emperor ought not yet to be made easy; that, on the contrary, he should be left, for some time longer on the Shoulders of *France*, who would at last be unable to support the Expence; that he had not otherwise disengaged himself from *France* than by Words only; and that he ought to confide more explicitly in his *Britannic* Majesty, since there was no Power but *England* able to extricate him from his Misfortunes, &c.'

His Imperial Majesty might easily perceive by the present Language of the *English* Minister, that it was expected he would blindly suffer himself to be directed by the Courts of *London* and *Vienna*. This appears evidently by the following Answer delivered in Writing the 3d of *August*.

'That as the Answer from *England* was not such as had been expected, it became
' now

' now necessary to act in Concert with the
 ' Queen of *Hungary*, in order to obtain *some-*
 ' *thing* for the Emperor. That if his Impe-
 ' rial Majesty would explain himself ingenu-
 ' ously as to the last Conditions he would
 ' take, the most should be done for him that
 ' could be possibly. That the Queen of
 ' *Hungary's* last Result should be required ;
 ' and when once Matters were accommodat-
 ' ed with that Princess, *England* might then,
 ' for her Part, do *something* for the Em-
 ' peror.'

This loose, unexpected, and insufficient
 Answer, so little corresponding with former
 Declarations, put an End to the Negociation ;
 at least the Landgrave of *Hesse*, who easily
 perceived the Meaning and Drift of the Court
 of *England*, would have no further hand in it.
 But the Emperor however, not being dis-
 couraged by his ill Success, persisted in his
 first Resolution of a settled Reconciliation, if
 that was possible; and so zealously intent
 was he to pave the Way to Peace, that no
 Difficulty, no Obstruction was able to alter
 his Purpose, while the least Hopes remain'd
 of Success. Wherefore he judg'd it proper
 to continue the Negociation by Means of Ba-
 ron *Haslang* his Minister with his *Britannic*
 Majesty, whom he ordered to insist on the
 Articles already agreed upon, and to add
 others in favour of the Court of *Vienna*, which
 in Substance were as follows.

' That

‘ That his Imperial Majesty was willing
 ‘ the Fortresses of his Hereditary Dominions
 ‘ should be garrisoned by neutral Troops till
 ‘ the final Conclusion of the Peace ; that he
 ‘ would consent the Empire should as-
 ‘ semble a neutral Army, to which, as
 ‘ a Mark of his Sincerity, he would join
 ‘ a Body of 15000 of his own Troops ; that
 ‘ he would withdraw his Garrisons from
 ‘ *Philipsbourg* and *Fort Keil*, which should
 ‘ be replaced by the Troops of the Circle ;
 ‘ and that he would give the strongest As-
 ‘ surances to the Maritime Powers of his
 ‘ Sincerity, and Intention to conform to all
 ‘ that should be agreed to.’

But Baron *Haslang* had no better Success
 than the Prince of *Hesse*. These fresh Proofs
 of the Emperor’s sincere Disposition to Peace,
 far from being received as they were intend-
 ed, as a Testimony of his upright Intentions,
 they seem’d to have quite another Effect.
 For though stronger Proofs of his Imperial
 Majesty’s sincere and pacific Sentiments could
 not well be given on his Side ; yet, on the
 other, Suspicions and Jealousies seem’d to in-
 crease with his Passiveness and Condescension.
 Though Baron *Haslang*, by Order from his
 Imperial Majesty, urged the Completion of
 so good a Work with all the Vigour and
 Warmth possible, yet were fresh Objections
 continually raised, and the Negotiation still
 postponed and delayed till the Conclusion of
 the

the Treaty of *Worms*. Then was an entire Stop put to the Baron's Negociation, all of a sudden, as if there never had been any such on the Tapis.

We have thought proper to publish this true and simple Account of what passed in regard to the Negociation at *Hanau*, between his late Imperial Majesty, our honoured Father, and his *Britannic* Majesty, in order to set the Public right as to that important Transaction. And we had it principally in our View to eternize in the Empire, at this Time without a Head, the Memory of an Emperor, who would have willingly sacrificed his own private Interest to the Safety, Happiness and Tranquillity of the *Germanic* Body. The Members of that august Corps may judge from this genuine Narrative of what passed, whether the Calamities and big Evils which have continued from that Period in the Empire, and are increas'd, can be imputed to a supreme Chief, who has been too soon snatched from the World. They will rather commiserate the low Circumstances he was reduced to, and consider how undeservedly he had been prosecuted and maltreated. They will perceive how desirous he was of Peace, and how arduously he sought every feazable Means for procuring the Repose of the Body of which he was Head. They will see how intent he was to reconcile and unite the Members, and maintain the Dignity and Authority

rity of the Empire: And they must discern, that he neglected no Opportunity for procuring the Welfare of a Body so dear to him; and that even to the Prejudice of his own particular Interests.

After all Hopes of accommodating amicably with the Court of *Vienna* were vanish'd, by the ill Success of the Negotiations at *Hanau*, it became natural and necessary for his Imperial Majesty to think of his own Preservation and the support of his rightful Claims. To this End, therefore, he enter'd into a stricter and closer Alliance with several Electors and Princes; which Alliance however, was founded on the Constitutions of the Empire, and had no View but the Glory and Repose of the *Germanic* Body. Then it was that the Union of *Frankfort* was formed, which had so considerably altered the Face of Affairs, that it could no longer be expected his Imperial Majesty would think of Peace on the same Conditions that had been rejected: And besides he had put it out of his Power by the Treaty of Union he had been forced into by his bad Success at *Hanau*, to treat singly of Peace, was he ever so inclined. But he continued inflexible to the last to contribute, as much as lay in his Power, to promote a just and honourable Peace, such as he might answer to Posterity.

We, who succeed to the late Emperor, our dear Father, of glorious Memory, bring with
us

us to the Government the same laudable Disposition to Peace, putting our Trust and Confidence in God, in these critical Times, as his Imperial Majesty did to the Hour of his Death. We shall never forget our Obligations as a Member of the Empire ; and shall promote as far as lies in us the speedy Conclusion of a lasting Peace, in order to put an End to a ruinous intestine War so fatal to the Empire, whose Safety and Welfare we shall always endeavour to procure and maintain to the best of our Power.

Such are our Sentiments, which you will take care to make public in our Name, and declare at the same time, that though we have not as yet assumed all the Titles that have descended to us as Heir to the late Emperor, our honoured Father, except one, which by its Essence includes the Whole, we have nevertheless yielded up none of our Hereditary Rights, which we reserve to ourself, and resolve to maintain and support. Whereof you will take notice, &c.

F I N I S.

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the best of our Power.

Such are our Sentiments, which you will
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declare at the same time that though we have
not as yet assumed all the Titles that have be-
longed to us as King to the late Emperor,
our benighted Liberty, except one, which by
its Name includes the Whole, we have ne-
vertheless yielded up none of our ordinary
Rights, which we reserve to ourselves, and re-
solve to maintain and support. Whereof you
will take notice, &c.

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